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Abstract
A new logic of belief (in the “only knowing” family) with confidence levels is presented. The logic allows a natural distinction
between explicit and implicit belief representations, where the explicit form directly expresses its models. The explicit form can
be found by applying a set of equivalence preserving rewriting rules to the implicit form. The rewriting process is performed
entirely within the logic, on the object level, provided we supply an explicit formalization of the logical space. We prove that the
problem of deciding whether there exists a consistent explicit form is p2 -complete, a complexity class to which many problems of
nonmonotonic reasoning belong. The article also contains a conceptual analysis of basic notions like belief, co-belief and degrees
of confidence.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This article presents the propositional modal logic Æ, a logic in the “only knowing” family of logical systems
pioneered by Levesque [8]. Compared to other propositional systems in this family the Æ system contributes on
three levels: conceptually by the introduction of a richer set of epistemic concepts, both for the description of the
system itself and for use in representation of common-sense patterns of reasoning within Æ; logically by being closed
under uniform substitution and being axiomatized entirely at the object-level; by an increased expressive power which
enables the representation of a certain sort of prioritized defaults.
The paper is structured as follows. Basic syntax and semantics are presented in Section 2; soundness, complete-
ness, the finite model property and decidability are established by means of techniques which are standard in modal
logic. Section 3 contains a philosophical interpretation of the main notions underlying the formal semantics of Æ,
in particular the notions of belief, co-belief and degree of confidence. From Section 4 onwards we continue on the
assumption that the language is finite. Finite languages allow us to define a particular formula which we shall call “the
logical space”, the effect of which is to turn the necessity operator into a true representation of logical necessity with
no ambiguity as to whether Boolean propositions are necessary, contingent or impossible. Finite languages also have
the capacity to represent exact belief states in a form which permits reduction into an explicit and particularly salient
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A. Waaler et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 5 (2007) 492–518 493form, a form which reflects its models transparently. This is the content of the Modal Reduction Theorem, the result
which forms the center of this study. In Section 4 we exploit the model theory of Æ to give a semantical proof of the
theorem.
In the rest of the paper we focus on computational aspects of the Modal Reduction Theorem. The first thing we
show is that the logical space, the size of which is exponential in the number of propositional letters, can be implicitly
defined and generated by means of meta-rules which generalize the special rule introduced by Levesque in his initial
paper on “only knowing”. In fact the propositional fragment of Levesque’s logic is a special case of the system Æρ
introduced in Section 5.1; more precisely it corresponds to adopting what we shall call the maximal logical space
and having only one degree of confidence in the language. Just as in Levesque’s system the proof checking problem
for Æρ is NP-complete (and not linear). Moreover, these logics are not closed under uniform substitution, a property
which holds for Æ and which traditionally has been used to distinguish a logic from a theory.
On the computational side there are, however, strong reasons for accepting Æρ as it gives an economic represen-
tation of the logical space, which otherwise is exponential in the number of propositional variables. The satisfiability
problem for Levesque’s system is p2 -complete [13,14], the same as for Æρ without confidence levels.
We finally identify a set of provable equivalences within Æ and prove that they are sufficient for proving the Modal
Reduction Theorem syntactically. The procedure is examplified in Section 6 to give an account of the restricted class
of prioritized supernormal defaults within Æ. For an encoding of full prioritized default logic, with a prescriptive
interpretation of the preference relation, see [3].
2. The logic Æ
2.1. Syntax
The object language contains a stock of propositional letters, the constants  and ⊥, and connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, ⊃
and ≡. If  is a finite set of formulae, ∧ (∨) is the conjunction (disjunction) of the elements of  in arbitrary
order. Modal operators are  (necessity) and modalities Bk (belief) and Ck (co-belief) for each k in a finite index set
I partially ordered by a relation 	. A modal atom is a formula of the form Bkϕ, Ckϕ, or ϕ, and a modal literal is
either a modal atom or its negation. We employ the following dual modalities: ϕ is ¬¬ϕ (ϕ is possible), bkϕ is
¬Bk¬ϕ (ϕ is compatible with belief at k), and ck is ¬Ck¬ϕ (ϕ is compatible with co-belief at k).
The intuitions behind the syntactical operators shall be addressed at length in Section 3, but some explanation
at this point facilitates the introduction of concepts that we shall use throughout the text. In short,  is intended to
express personal necessities. We shall read the formula (ϕ ⊃ ψ) as ϕ entails ψ and say that ϕ is at least as strong
as ψ . The formulaϕ∧¬ϕ expresses that ϕ is contingent. Despite the fact that  can easily be defined by means of
the belief and co-belief operators we shall take it as primitive; this choice is made both to give the operator conceptual
priority and to facilitate technical arguments.
The indices in I are intended to represent various degrees of confidence or conviction. Bkϕ expresses that ϕ is be-
lieved with degree of confidence k; Ckϕ expresses that ϕ is co-believed with degree of confidence k. In the following,
we will sometimes abbreviate “degree of confidence” as doc and write that ϕ is believed at k when Bkϕ holds.
The belief and co-belief operators are complementary. Ckϕ expresses a notion of caution, and can generally be
read as expressing that at most ¬ϕ is believed with degree of confidence k; or, what amounts to the same, that ¬ϕ is
at least as strong as everything that is believed at k (see Section 3.2 for a caveat regarding this interpretation). The “all
I know at k” expression Okϕ is central; it abbreviates Bkϕ ∧ Ck¬ϕ, meaning that precisely ϕ is believed with doc k.
Some syntactical concepts: A formula ϕ is completely modalized if every occurrence of a propositional letter is
within the scope of a modal operator. It is purely Boolean if it contains no occurrences of modal operators. The
propositional substitution operator [·/·] distributes over connectives and modalities in the obvious way. ϕ[ψ1/ψ2] is
ϕ with every subformula occurrence of ψ1 substituted with ψ2. A tautology is a substitution instance of a formula
valid in classical propositional logic (such as ϕ ⊃ ϕ); if ϕ is a tautology of propositional logic we shall write

PL ϕ. The logic Æ is defined as the least set that contains all tautologies, contains all instances of the following
schemata for each k ∈ I :
Def: ϕ ≡ (Bkϕ ∧ Ckϕ) T : ϕ ⊃ ϕ
KB: Bk(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (Bkϕ ⊃ Bkψ) KC: Ck(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (Ckϕ ⊃ Ckψ)
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B: ¬Bkϕ ⊃¬Bkϕ C: ¬Ckϕ ⊃¬Ckϕ
PB: Biϕ ⊃ Bkϕ for all i ≺ k PC: Ckϕ ⊃ Ciϕ for all i ≺ k
and is closed under all instances of the rules:
ϕ
ϕ (RN)
ϕ ϕ ⊃ ψ
ψ
(MP)
PB and PC are the Persistence axioms for B and C respectively. We write 
 ϕ if ϕ is a theorem of Æ. If 
 (ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧
ϕn) ⊃ ψ , we sometimes write ϕ1, . . . , ϕn 
 ψ and refer to ϕ1, . . . , ϕn as premises.
The logic of  is S5. To see this, note that the T schema is an axiom, that we can combine axioms Def, B and
C to yield the 4-schema ϕ ⊃ ϕ and that Def, B and C yield the 5-schema ¬ϕ ⊃ ¬ϕ. Similarly, we
can show that Bk and Ck are both K45.
2.2. Models
An Æ-model M is a quadruple (U,U+,U−,V ), where U is a non-empty set of points; U+ and U− are functions
which assign a subset of U to each index in I . U+(k) is denoted U+k ; U
−
k denotes U−(k). V is a valuation function
which assigns a subset of U to each propositional letter in the language.
An Æ-model is intended to represent a doxastic subject (cf. Section 3). U is the universe of the subjectively
possible states of affairs, i.e., the range of states of affairs that the subject can conceive of. Equating possibility and
conceivability, we occasionally refer to U as the space of conceivability. The subject has a belief state at each degree
of confidence k, modeled by U+k , and a co-belief state, modeled by U−k . We abbreviate ‘degree of confidence’ as doc.
Any point in U+k is a candidate, with doc k, for being the actual world. Points in U
+
k are called k-plausible, or doxastic
alternatives at k. U−k is, accordingly, the set of k-implausible points, i.e., the set of worlds that are ruled out, at k, as
not actual.
For each k ∈ I , we require that
(SU)U+k ∪U−k = U.
SU, named for subjective universe, expresses that the universe is just the set of points that are, for any given k, either
plausible or implausible to the doxastic subject. While belief states may vary between degrees of confidence, the
universe does not.
The more alternatives the subject can rule out, the stronger the belief state. We require that greater confidence is
never accompanied by stronger belief:
(Persistence)U+k ⊆ U+i and U−i ⊆ U−k for each i ≺ k.
The model is bisected if, for each k ∈ I ,
(Bisection)U+k ∩U−k = ∅.
This is not a model condition; not a property that is forced by the axiom system. However, we can force Bisection to
be satisfied by syntactic means; this is proved in Lemma 2 below and further discussed in Section 4.2.
A satisfaction relation can be defined for each point x:
M x p iff x ∈ V (p) for a propositional letter p
M x ϕ iff M y ϕ for each y ∈ U
M x Bkϕ iff M y ϕ for each y ∈ U+k
M x Ckϕ iff M y ϕ for each y ∈ U−k
and as usual for Boolean connectives. A formula is satisfied in a model if it is true at one of its points. If M x ϕ for
all x ∈ U , we write M  ϕ and say that ϕ is true in M. If ϕ is true in all models, we shall write  ϕ.
Observe that all points in a model agree on the truth value of every completely modalized formula. Hence, for such
formulae the notions of satisfaction and truth in a model coincide. This justifies use of the notation M  ϕ whenever a
A. Waaler et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 5 (2007) 492–518 495completely modalized ϕ is satisfied in M . Note that even though neither Bk nor Ck satisfies the D schema from modal
logic, for each formula ϕ, either Bkϕ ⊃ bkϕ or Ckϕ ⊃ ckϕ is true in any given model.
It follows directly from the truth definition that a proposition is necessary if and only if it holds in all conceivable
alternatives. We omit the easy proofs of the properties in the following lemma, in which we write ‖ϕ‖ for the truth set
of ϕ in M : {x ∈ U | M x ϕ}.
Lemma 1. (1) M  Bkϕ iff U+k ⊆ ‖ϕ‖ and M  Ckϕ iff U−k ⊆ ‖ϕ‖.
(2) If M Okϕ, then U+k = ‖ϕ‖ and U−k = ‖¬ϕ‖.
(3) ‖ϕ‖ ⊆ ‖ψ‖ iff M  ϕ ⊃ ψ .
(4) ‖ϕ‖ = ‖ϕ[ψ1/ψ2]‖ if ‖ψ1‖ = ‖ψ2‖.
Lemma 2. Let M be a model which, for each k ∈ I , satisfies a formula Okϕk . Then M is bisected.
Proof. By Lemma 1(2). 
Lemma 3. Let β be completely modalized. Then  ϕ ≡ (ϕ[β/] ∧ β)∨ (ϕ[β/⊥] ∧ ¬β).
Proof. Let M be an arbitrary model. If β is completely modalized, then M  β ≡  or M  β ≡ ⊥. Applying
Lemma 1(4), we obtain M  ϕ ≡ ϕ[β/] or M  ϕ ≡ ϕ[β/⊥], respectively, and thus in either case we have
M 
(
(β ≡ )∧ (ϕ ≡ ϕ[β/]))∨ ((β ≡ ⊥)∧ (ϕ ≡ ϕ[β/⊥])),
which is tautologically equivalent to the formula in the lemma. 
The next lemma expresses a simple reduction property of nested occurrences of modalities.
Lemma 4. Any formula is equivalent to a formula without nested occurrences of modalities.
Proof. The lemma is trivial for formulae without nested modalities; for an induction on the length of formulae,
suppose ϕ contains nested modalities. Then ϕ contains a modal atom β as a proper subformula. By Lemma 3, ϕ is
equivalent to a Boolean combination of the shorter formulae ϕ[β/], ϕ[β/⊥] and β , and hence we are done by the
induction hypothesis. 
We shall say that formulae without nested occurrences of modalities are in normal form. Formulae in normal form
that are not purely Boolean shall be said to be of modal depth 1.
Lemma 5. Let M Oiϕi and M Okϕk . If i ≺ k, then M  ϕk ⊃ ϕi .
Proof. Assume that Oiϕi and Okϕk both hold in M and that i ≺ k. By Lemma 1(2) and the Persistence requirement on
models we then obtain ‖ϕk‖ ⊆ ‖ϕi‖, which yields the conclusion of the lemma by an application of Lemma 1(3). 
Theorem 6. Æ is sound, i.e., 
 ϕ implies  ϕ for any ϕ.
Proof. By routine induction on the length of proofs. 
2.3. Completeness and the finite model property
To facilitate the proofs of completeness and decidability we shall in this section introduce an alternative semantics
for Æ. The alternative interpretation is a standard relational semantics with a structure that directly reflects the axioms.
Let us say that a frame is a quadruple (W,E,R,S), where the universe W is non-empty, E is a binary relation
over W , and R and S are functions that assign binary relations over W to each doc in I . R and S satisfy the following
constraints:
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(f2) E is reflexive,
(f3) E = Rk ∪ Sk for each k ∈ I ,
(f4) if i ≺ k, then Ri ⊆ Rk and Sk ⊆ Si .
As usual Rk denotes R(k) and (x, y) ∈ X ◦ Y iff there is a z such that xXz and zYy. Two of the eight instances
of (f1) state that Rk and Sk are transitive, e.g. Rk ◦ Rk ⊆ Rk , while two of them state that they are Euclidean, e.g.
Rk ◦ Rk ⊆ Rk . A relational model is a frame equipped with a valuation function V which assigns a subset of the
universe to each propositional letter. A relational model M evaluates modal formulae by quantifying over Rk and Sk :
M x Bkϕ iff M y ϕ for each y such that xRky; M x Ckϕ iff M y ϕ for each y such that xSky.
Lemma 7. E is an equivalence relation.
Proof. Reflexivity is (f2). Transitivity: Let k by any index in I . Then (Rk ∪ Sk) ◦ (Rk ∪ Sk) ⊆ Rk ◦ Rk ∪ Rk ◦ Sk ∪
Sk ◦ Rk ∪ Sk ◦ Sk . By (f1) each composition is included in Rk ∪ Sk . By (f3), E ◦ E ⊆ E. Euclideanness: (Rk ∪ Sk) ◦
(Rk ∪ Sk) ⊆ (Rk ◦ Rk ∩ Rk ◦ Sk) ∪ (Sk ◦ Rk ∩ Sk ◦ Sk), which, by (f1), is included in Rk ∩ Sk = Rk ∪ Sk . By (f3),
E ◦E ⊆ E. 
A cluster is an equivalence class of W modulo E. Let C be an E-cluster. We define the belief part with regard to
k, C+k , and the co-belief part with regard to k, C−k , of C by: C+k = {x ∈ C | xRkx} and C−k = {x ∈ C | xSkx}.
Lemma 8. Rk ∩ (C ×C) = C ×C+k and Sk ∩ (C ×C) = C ×C−k .
Proof. Let x, y ∈ C. Assume first that xRky. By Euclideanness, yRky. This shows that Rk ∩ (C × C) ⊆ C × C+k .
Conversely, assume yRky. The assumption that x, y ∈ C implies, by (f2), that either xRky or xSky. In the latter case
Sk ◦Rk ⊆ Rk gives xRky; hence xRky in any case. Sk is treated symmetrically. 
Clusters provide the link between the relational models in this section and the Æ-models introduced in Section 2.2.
The basic intuition is that a cluster corresponds exactly to a subjective universe. Note that if x is a point in a cluster
C, then C consists of all and only those points which x can see through E, i.e., through either Rk (which gives the
k-plausible points) or Sk (which gives the k-implausible points).
Lemma 9. Each Æ-model is isomorphic to a cluster in a relational model, and vice versa. Hence a formula has an
Æ-model iff it has a relational model.
Proof. From an Æ-model (U,U+,U−,V ) we can construct a relational model (U,U ×U,R,S,V ), where Rk = U+k
and Sk = U−k . It is easy to verify that the four frame conditions hold in the model; this is left to the reader. By Lemma 8
the relational model has one and only one cluster, i.e. U ; it is hence immediate that the two models agree on the truth
value of every formula at any point in U . Conversely, let C be a cluster in a relational model (W,E,R,S,V ) and let
VC be a valuation function such that VC(p) = V (p)∩C. Let C+ be a function which to each doc k assigns the set C+k
and C− be defined similarly. Consider the quadruple M = (C,C+,C−,VC). Isomorphy follows from Lemma 8. To
see that M is an Æ-model, note that since Rk ∪ Sk is reflexive, either xRkx or xSkx. This shows that the SU condition
is met. Persistence holds by (f4). Clearly, truth coincides in the two models for every point in C. 
Lemma 9 justifies a technical focus on relational models as all results established on the basis of these models
immediately transfer to Æ-models (and hence to Æ). This holds in particular for completeness and the Finite model
property, addressed next.
A set s of formulae is maximal if it is consistent, and every proper extension of it is inconsistent. Two maximal sets
s and t agree on a formula ϕ if ϕ ∈ s iff ϕ ∈ t . Let Uc be the set of all maximal sets, V c(p) = {s ∈ Uc | p ∈ s}, where
p is a propositional letter, and the binary relations Rck, S
c
k on U
c be defined by:
sRct iff for all ϕ, Bkϕ ∈ s → ϕ ∈ t,k
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sEct iff for all ϕ, ϕ ∈ s → ϕ ∈ t.
The canonical model Mc is defined as (Uc,Ec,Rc, Sc,V c), where Rc assigns Rck to each k and Sc similarly.
Lemma 10. Let sEct . Then s and t agree on all modal atoms.
Proof. Let ϕ be a modal atom or the negation of a modal atom. If ϕ ∈ s, ϕ ∈ s by one of the axioms B, C, B
and C. By construction of Ec, ϕ ∈ t . 
Since the modalities are normal, the Truth Lemma holds: Mc s ϕ iff ϕ ∈ s. Completeness can then be established
in the usual way:
Theorem 11. Æ is complete, i.e., if  ϕ then 
 ϕ.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that Mc is a relational model, i.e., that the frame conditions are met. Each subcondition
of (f1) is imposed on Mc by one of the axioms B, C, B and C in combination with Def. We illustrate one of
them: let sSck t and tR
c
ku, and assume Bkϕ ∈ s. By C and Def, CkBkϕ ∈ s. Hence ϕ ∈ u and sRcku. Condition (f2)
is imposed by axiom T . As to (f3), assume first that not sRckt and not sSck t . There are then formulae Bkϕ ∈ s and
Ckψ ∈ s such that ¬(ϕ ∨ψ) ∈ t . By Def, (ϕ ∨ψ) ∈ s, hence not sEct . Conversely, assume that not sEct , i.e., that
there is a ϕ ∈ s such that ¬ϕ ∈ t . By Def, Bkϕ ∈ s and Ckϕ ∈ s. By construction, not sRckt and not sSck t . Axioms
PB and PC force condition (f4) on Mc. 
A filtration set is a set of formulae  which is closed under subformulae, and which satisfies ≺-closure: whenever
i ≺ k, Bk ∈  if Bi ∈  and Ci ∈  if Ck ∈  .
The filtration M† = (U†,E†,R†, S†,V †) of Mc through  is defined as follows. U† is the set of equivalence
classes of Uc modulo ∼ , where the equivalence relation ∼ on Uc is defined by: s ∼ t iff s ∩  = t ∩ ; the
equivalence class of s modulo ∼ is denoted |s|. V † is a function which, for all propositional letters p in  , satisfies:
V †(p) = {|s| | p ∈ s}. The binary relations are given by:
|s|E†|t | iff s and t agree on all modal atoms in ,
|s|R†k |t | iff ∀χ(Bkχ ∈ s ∩ → χ ∈ t ∩) and |s|E†|t |,
|s|S†k |t | iff ∀χ(Ckχ ∈ s ∩ → χ ∈ t ∩) and |s|E†|t |.
Lemma 12. M† is a relational model.
Proof. All subconditions of the frame condition (f1) are easily verified from the definition of R†k and S†k ; we show
that S†k ◦R†k ⊆ R†k . Let |s|S†k |t | and |t |R†k |u|. Then |s|E†|u|; hence Bkϕ ∈ s ∩ only if Bkϕ ∈ t ∩ only if ϕ ∈ u∩ .
E† is trivially reflexive. To show (f3), assume that not |s|R†k |t | and not |s|S†k |t |. There is then an s ∈ Uc, and formulae
Bkϕ and Ckψ , both in s ∩ , such ϕ /∈ t and ψ /∈ t . By axiom Def, (ϕ∨ψ) ∈ s. If |s|E†|t |, ϕ∨ψ ∈ t ; hence either
ϕ ∈ t or ψ ∈ t , contradicting the previous conclusion. This proves that E† ⊆ R†k ∪ S†k . The converse inclusion of (f3)
is trivial. Condition (f4) follows from ≺-closure of the filtration set and the persistence axiom. 
The Filtration Theorem holds for Æ:
Theorem 13. For all s ∈ Uc and ϕ ∈  , M† |s| ϕ iff ϕ ∈ s.
Proof. By standard theory it is sufficient to show that E† satisfies the following two conditions: (i) if sEct then
|s|E†|t |; (ii) if |s|E†|t | and ϕ ∈ s ∩ , then ϕ ∈ t ∩ , and that R†k and S†k satisfy the corresponding two conditions.
Condition (ii) trivially holds for all of them. To prove (i) for E†, assume that not |s|E†|t |. Then |s| and |t | disagree on
some modal atom in  . By Lemma 10 not sEct . Condition (ii) is then easily verified for R†k and S†k . 
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Proof. By Lemmas 12, Theorem 13 and the fact that the size of the filtration set which contains a formula, say ϕ, can
be bound by |I | × |ϕ|, where |ϕ| is the number of subformulae of ϕ. 
3. Interpretation
This section is dedicated to the informal interpretation of Æ, with an emphasis on models. For comparison, consider
what we may call standard doxastic logic, the modal logic KD45 with a single belief operator B . Æ differs from the
standard in three main respects: it does not have a consistency (D) schema for belief, it has an additional ‘co-belief’
modality C, and it introduces a set of degrees of confidence indexing the modalities.
Although “only knowing” logic is not a new idea (Levesque’s pioneering paper [8] is fifteen years old at the time of
writing), we believe there is still a place for a closer look at the conceptual framework and the proper interpretation of
the doxastic language in B and C. Throughout this section, doc indexes will be suppressed where they are not subject
of discussion.
3.1. A personal universe
The first word about Æ models is that the universe U comprises every state of affairs that is conceivable to the
implicit doxastic subject. Conceivability is here to be understood as the expression of “personal metaphysics”: the
subject’s notion of what is necessarily the case, what it takes for granted, basic presuppositions, that which is beyond
doubt. U is the range of worlds that the subject considers possible.
At each degree of confidence k, U+k defines a belief state, consisting of the doxastic alternatives, the points that are
consistent with what is believed at k. It is natural to view the belief modality B as expressing that points are ruled out
as implausible: Bϕ expresses that every point that has ¬ϕ true is ruled out. Cϕ, on the other hand, expresses that no
point at which ¬ϕ is true is ruled out, that every ¬ϕ point is plausible (given a bisected model; see Section 3.2).
The semantic constraint that U is non-empty implies that the truth axiom ϕ ⊃ ϕ is valid (what is necessary is
true). We may interpret the constraint as a requirement that the real state of affairs is conceivable. The real state of
affairs is however not necessarily contained in U+k , and while it is never plausible for the subject that any of its beliefs
is false, situations in which some are may still be conceivable; if so, then as implausible. In formal terms, while(Bϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) is satisfiable, b(Bϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) is not.
Where we draw the line between the necessary and the contingent is a matter of practical application. The minimal
notion of metaphysics is easily identified: to count only logical truths as necessary. This requires a maximal universe,
with every logically consistent proposition represented at some point. For a comprehensive metaphysics, U should
be restricted so that no point validates anything the subject considers impossible. One case in point is the analytic
relationships between concepts. There is a great difference between the belief that “cats are not made of stone” and a
contingent belief such as “cats make ideal pets”. Certainly, the fact that what is taken for granted varies from context
to context is of considerable relevance to common-sense reasoning. It is therefore a notable feature of Æ models that
they can accommodate stricter notions of what is necessary than the logically true.
3.2. At most and O
In the “only knowing” literature, from Levesque’s [8] onwards, the focus has mainly been on applications of the O
operator, with Oϕ expressing that precisely ϕ, i.e., ϕ, and at most ϕ, is believed. ‘At most ϕ is believed’ means that
ϕ is at least as strong as the strongest believed proposition, and C¬ϕ has been, appropriately, taken to express this
notion.
With Æ, the situation is less straightforward. An ‘at most’ interpretation of C¬ϕ is supported by the observation
that whenever C¬ϕ is true, the truth set of ϕ is a subset of the belief state,
(1)If M  C¬ϕ then ‖ϕ‖ ⊆ U+.
The lack of Bisection as a requirement for Æ models means, however, that the converse does not hold, which implies
that what is believed at most is only partly characterized by C formulae. While a set of C formulae can approximate the
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belief state, as evidenced by (1), in cases where the set of formulae has a model which is not bisected the approximation
can never supply a complete characterization.
In a non-bisected model, U+ ∩ U− is nonempty, a set of points that are both plausible and implausible, and the
belief state does not properly complement the co-belief state. Every proposition ϕ whose truth set ‖ϕ‖ is a subset of
U+ ∩ U− (cf. Fig. 1) should be said to be believed ‘at most’. (Too see this, note that if ‖ϕ‖ is a subset of U+ ∩ U−,
it is a subset of the belief state U+. Hence ϕ is at least as strong as the strongest believed proposition, which by
definition means that at most ϕ is believed.) C¬ϕ will not hold in such a case. Furthermore, there is then no formula
ψ such that Bψ ∧C¬ψ (i.e., Oψ ) is true.
It is clear that we cannot provide a full account of the meaning of Cϕ by means of the notion of belief ‘at most’
alone. For the purposes of providing an informal account of meaning, we shall associate the attitude of caution with
co-belief, and hence with the set of implausible alternatives U−. Accordingly, let the notion of being skeptical apply
to belief and the set of plausible alternatives U+. In a bisected model, caution and skepticism as employed here will
be extensionally equivalent.1
In order to find an interpretation of Cϕ that doesn’t rely on belief ‘at most’, consider the roles of belief and co-
belief in a model. According to the model definition, beliefs serve to exclude conceivable alternatives from the set of
plausibles, while co-beliefs serve to exclude conceivable alternatives from the set of implausibles. The more a subject
co-believes, the more cautious the subject is.
We propose the following reading of Cϕ, for which to ‘rule out’ refers to rendering implausible.
Cϕ: Every alternative that caution permits to be ruled out has ϕ true.
To see why this is appropriate, consider again how a belief state is determined. The more the subject believes, the
smaller is the set of plausible points. Each belief (in a contingent proposition) contributes to the approximation of the
belief state by eliminating points from the set of plausible alternatives. With co-belief, the situation is inverted. The
more is co-believed, the less is considered implausible. A maximally cautious co-believer will consider no alternative
implausible, just as the maximally skeptical believer considers every alternative plausible. The adoption of a co-belief
that ϕ amounts to an increase in caution: to excluding all non-ϕ points from the set of implausible alternatives.
A non-bisected model may be interpreted as a model of a subject that has a discrepancy between caution and belief;
between caution to not accept evidence and actual acceptance. In a bisected model, however, there is a co-belief to
match every belief; just the right amount of caution to match what is believed.
Only when we have a bisected model is it appropriate to say that co-belief determines the belief state U+, and
that belief characterizes the co-belief state U−. Similarly, while b and c restrict U+ and U−, respectively, from
below, when the model is bisected, and only then, we can appropriately say that c is an expression of belief, and b an
expression of co-belief.
Non-bisected models may have a potential for representing a subtle form of doxastic underdetermination. Never-
theless, we will in the remainder of this section work under the presupposition that models are in fact bisected, in line
with the common practice of interpreting C as an “at most” operator.
1 The requirement SU (Section 2.2) is analogous to a principle of excluded middle in ensuring that every point is either plausible or implausible.
Accordingly, when Bisection is satisfied the model satisfies a form of non-contradiction, in that no point is both plausible and implausible.
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3.3. B and C
How does the language of Æ expand on the traditional doxastic language in B , and how are the additional modal-
ities that Æ provides related? Let us begin by pointing out what B and b, which have a standard definition in Æ,
mean. Bϕ is a general and positive belief modality, expressing that every conceivable alternative at which ϕ is false is
implausible; bϕ is a particular and negative modality that says some alternative at which ϕ is true is plausible. Thus,
Bϕ expresses belief (in a weak sense, knowledge) while bϕ expresses non-belief (in a weak sense, ignorance).
In Æ, the language is enriched with a general and negative modality C, and a particular and positive modality c.
Fig. 2 relates the simple modalities in a design analogous to a traditional “square of oppositions”, where arrows express
implication and lines without arrowheads express contradiction. Different styles of line correspond to preconditions.
Whole lines illustrate unconditional relationships, dashed lines apply only given a consistent belief state, and dotted
lines apply only if ϕ is contingent. The positive (knowledge) modalities have been placed in the rear corners of the
cube, negative (ignorance) modalities in front.
Let a doxastic attitude toward a proposition be the attitude of belief, disbelief, undecidedness, and so forth as given
by a model. The addition of C to the doxastic language in B expands the range of doxastic attitudes that we can
express. For illustration, consider the following as examples of propositions that a doxastic subject can relate to.
ϕ: “David Beckham hates public attention”
ψ : “David Beckham is a cat”
χ : “David Beckham is a cat and David Beckham is not a cat”
ϕ is generally believed to be false, but could conceivably be true (the popular image of Mr. Beckham may well be
misleading). Barring extreme skepticism, ψ is an impossibility, although not a logical impossibility by most standards.
χ is a logical impossibility according to any relevant standard. These are distinctions that are readily grasped, and it
is desirable that a doxastic language should be able to express them.
Using C and B together, we can distinguish belief in propositions that the subject takes to be necessarily true from
belief in contingent propositions. ϕ is an example of a proposition that is believed to be false, although it is perfectly
possible to imagine a world in which it is true; this doxastic attitude is captured in formula (2).
(2)B¬ϕ ∧ cϕ
For any proposition ψ that is considered impossible, we can make use of the following representation.
(3)B¬ψ ∧C¬ψ
(3) is by definition equivalent to ¬ψ – “ψ is impossible”. Semantically, B¬ψ expresses that no alternative that has
ψ true is plausible, while C¬ψ says that no alternative with ψ true is implausible; by (SU), then, there can be no
alternative in which ψ is true.
The C operator enables us to express the distinction between belief in necessities and belief in contingent proposi-
tions. It might also be useful to be able to distinguish “metaphysical” from logical necessity, such as with χ above, but
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this desideratum is not fulfilled. We cannot distinguish, by Æ expressions, non-belief due to metaphysical impossibil-
ity from non-belief due to logical impossibility. (We do however provide an axiomatic method for specifying what is
necessary and what is contingent, in Section 4.)
The attitude expressed by Bϕ is often called “knowledge”. The lack of a truth schema for B implies, however, that
Æ should be seen as a logic of belief only, as the notion of knowledge clearly requires that what is known is also true.2
A similar consideration applies to calling C an “ignorance” operator: only part of what goes by the name of ignorance
is captured by expressions such as Cϕ. Knowledge and ignorance are on a par in presupposing a notion of correctness
that is not required for simple belief. Two prominent cases of ignorance are, to believe ϕ while ϕ is false, and to not
believe ϕ while ϕ is true. The truth value of ϕ is essential to both variants.
Because it does satisfy the truth axiom T,  may be considered a candidate for a knowledge operator in Æ.
However, because  also satisfies the negative introspection schemaϕ ⊃ϕ, it is arguably too strong for a proper
knowledge operator (see [7, p. 79]).
3.4. Doxastic positions
Expressions of doxastic attitude toward a proposition can be more or less precise. For instance, an expression of
belief Bϕ can be specified further by combining it with bϕ, to express that ϕ is consistently believed, or with C¬ϕ to
say that precisely ϕ is believed.
Referring to Fig. 2, we see that there are four consistent pairs of modal literals for each of B and C, the pairs linked
by horizontal edges of the cube. Each pair corresponds to a distinct doxastic attitude toward the subject proposition,
and each pair of formulae expresses this doxastic attitude as precisely as can be done using the respective operator.
Forming conjunctions of each pair (for B and C, respectively), we obtain a set of consistent and mutually exclusive
formulae, the disjunction of which is a tautology. We will refer to members of such a set of formulae as doxastic
positions.3
A set of doxastic positions corresponds to the range of doxastic attitudes that can be distinguished by means of the
respective operator. It is therefore useful for the purpose of describing the expressive power of the doxastic language.
The sets of doxastic positions for B and C are shown in Fig. 3, ordered by weakness of belief state. Labels T, L, R,
and B stand for “top”, “left”, “right”, and “bottom”. The top positions are expressions of lack of belief, of weakness
of the belief state. For B , the T position expresses undecidedness with regard to ϕ. The T position for C expresses
maximal weakness of belief, that no contingent proposition is believed. Employing a useful analogy, we may say that
C⊥ is true when the “database” of beliefs is empty. The B positions are the strongest expressions of belief. For B , the
B position corresponds to inconsistent belief (every proposition is believed). The B position for C says that there are
some ϕ alternatives as well as some non-ϕ alternatives among those that are inconsistent with what is believed. The
L and R positions are intermediate with regard to strength of the belief state. For B , position L represents the attitude
2 The reader may well find this comment uncongenial to what is implied by the title of this paper, namely, that Æ should be a logic of knowledge.
Our choice of title was dictated by the standard naming practice for “only knowing” logics. Perhaps in favor of this practice, observe that the notion
of belief expressed by Bϕ is clearly stronger than the commonsensical use of the term “belief”, in expressing a notion of conviction that ϕ is true,
and not a weaker attitude that ϕ is, e.g., more likely to be true than non-ϕ. The common association of Bϕ with knowledge that ϕ may be by
analogy to the strong connection between having a belief and possessing evidence for that belief, which amounts to having learned that ϕ is true.
3 The treatment here is inspired by the theory of normative positions in deontic and action logic, in particular [16], which see for a formal
framework and references. Little has been published regarding doxastic positions. The first use of the term may be in [11].
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of consistent belief that ϕ. For C, the L position expresses that at most ϕ is believed, that nothing is believed that is
stronger than ϕ (C¬ϕ), while ¬ϕ holds in some alternative that is incompatible with what is believed; i.e., that the
database is not empty.
We now look at the possible combinations of B and C positions, in order to see what C adds to the language with
just B with regard to a finer partitioning of the range of expressible attitudes.
Forming conjunctions of the B and C positions of Fig. 3, we find that 15 of 16 conjunctions are consistent; the
exception is B⊥ ∧ C⊥ (implying ⊥ by axiom schemata Def and T ). This set of doxastic positions is presented in
Fig. 4.
Fig. 4 has been designed for comparison between positions rather than to show the full form of each position. It
should be read as follows. Each node in the graph represents the combination of a B and a C position. The node
labels LT, LR, and so forth show which combination of basic B and C positions is represented at each node: the left
letter stands for the B position, the right letter for the C position. The top row indicates the alethic modality of ϕ
that is implied by the position, and formulae at nodes in the graph have been simplified accordingly. For instance, the
node LT, which corresponds to an empty belief state, is shown as C⊥, suppressing the conjunct Bϕ ∧ bϕ in order
to facilitate comparison to the other nodes TT and RT that also represent empty belief states. As in Fig. 3, nodes are
ordered by implied strength of belief state, with weaker belief states at higher nodes.
Explanations of what is expressed by each position follow. We will occasionally draw on the natural analogy
between belief states and databases.
TT, LT, RT. These positions express that the subject has no contingent belief—that the database is empty. The
positions differ only with regard to the modality of ϕ. LT expresses that ϕ is a necessity; RT, that it is an impossibil-
ity. While the positions will typically express a lack of belief, only the position TT necessarily implies a degree of
ignorance. The exception obtains when every truth is necessary according to the subject’s metaphysics, hence also
believed. Such a subject has perfect belief. LT or RT will then properly express the belief state, depending on whether
ϕ is true in the single conceivable alternative or not.
BR, BB, BL. These positions all represent an inconsistent belief state, and differ only in the modality assigned to ϕ,
accordingly as in LT, TT, RT.
TL. For this position, C¬ϕ expresses that the subject believes at most ϕ, meaning that every ϕ-compatible propo-
sition is plausible. From b¬ϕ, we see that the position is consistent, while c¬ϕ informs us that the database is not
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as saying that less than ϕ is believed.
LL. In this position, precisely ϕ is believed. All and only the alternatives that have ϕ true are plausible.
TB. This position corresponds well with the common-sense notion of suspension of judgment with regard to ϕ.
ϕ is believed neither true nor false (bϕ ∧ b¬ϕ). Furthermore, the database is not empty: some ϕ- as well as some
¬ϕ-alternatives are implausible.
LB. This position is the best candidate for expressing the default, common-sense notion that ϕ is believed. ϕ, and
more (cϕ), is believed, and the belief state is consistent (bϕ).
LR. For this position, Bϕ and Cϕ combine to express that ϕ is necessary. bϕ ensures that belief is consistent, and
cϕ that the database is not empty.
(The positions TR, RR, and RB differ from TL, LL, and LB only with respect to the negation of ϕ.)
Given that I is non-singleton, Persistence implies that the subject’s attitude toward a proposition ϕ—the doxastic
position of the subject with regard to ϕ—can only remain unchanged or get stronger as degree of confidence is
lowered. The vertical ordering of nodes displayed in Fig. 4 therefore corresponds to possible changes of doxastic
attitude towards ϕ from doc i to a lesser doc j .
3.5. Degrees of confidence
We now consider the question, to what extent does Æ provide an appropriate framework for representing the
common-sense notion of degrees of confidence? With Æ, the set of doc’s I is ordered by the relation of conviction ≺,
and i ≺ j is intended to mean that i is at least as great a doc as j .
The direction of the partial order relation ≺ deserves a comment. Following most authors in the field we write i ≺ k
to denote that i is at least as great a degree of confidence as k. Persistence implies that the belief state corresponding
to k is at least as strong as the belief state corresponding to i when i ≺ k, a perspective which justifies the direction
of the sign. There is an intrinsic tension in the use of the symbol because we want it to reflect that in general, lesser
degrees of confidence are accompanied by increase in strength of the belief state. The direction of the sign necessarily
has to reflect one and only one of these perspectives.
In practical application, the degrees of confidence we acknowledge, and the relations between them, vary widely
with the situation. On the roughest possible approach, only one degree of confidence is recognized. This means we
don’t distinguish the reliability of mathematical beliefs from the reliability of beliefs based on hearsay. When we do
make a distinction, a common approach is to recognize two degrees of confidence, one for beliefs based on empirical
evidence and another, greater, degree to beliefs based on a priori insights. We can go on to make arbitrarily fine-
grained distinctions; indeed, it may be possible to argue that every belief should be assigned its own separate degree
of confidence. Finding an appropriate resolution is a pragmatic, application-dependent issue.
There is little reason, in general, to expect that a relation of degrees of confidence will be linear. Beliefs typically
come with different degrees of confidence because the sources of the evidence upon which the beliefs are based vary
with regard to their reliability. Just as it may be difficult to compare the reliability of sources, it may be difficult or
impossible to determine which of two degrees of confidence should be considered greater.
The model condition that governs degrees of confidence in Æ is Persistence (Section 2.2), corresponding to the
axioms PB and PC . Persistence of belief means that what is believed with a given degree of conviction is also part of
what is believed at any comparably lesser degree of confidence.
Persistence is clearly a required property for a relation of strength of belief. Note that only what is expressed by
positive belief modalities is preserved in lesser doc’s. The following formulations of the positive modalities are helpful
in revealing why this is appropriate.
Bkϕ: I am k-confident that ϕ is true.
ckϕ: I am k-confident that ϕ is compatible with a falsity.
This yields the following explanations of bkϕ and Ckϕ, emphasizing that they express lack of belief.
bkϕ: I am not k-confident that ϕ is false.
Ckϕ: I am not k-confident that ¬ϕ is compatible with a falsity.
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It is difficult to account for the origin and character of degrees of confidence using only the notions of belief
states and persistence. Intuitively, we prefer to consider belief states at varying doc’s as outcomes, as consequences of
evidence processing that is sensitive to distinctions between more, and less, reliable sources of evidence. Degrees of
confidence apply in the first instance to evidence, the “input”, and only derivatively to belief, the outcome of a process
that merges the input with antecedent doxastic attitudes. It is, for instance, insufficient to say that what is believed at
priority i stems from a source (sources) of evidence whose reliability matches i, because what is believed at doc i
depends not only on the evidence that is i-quality, but essentially also on whether that evidence is compatible with
evidence that is more reliable than i. What is believed at priority i is typically only a subset of the evidence that has
priority i. On this view, the property of Persistence should be understood on the basis of evidence priorities, and not
as a principle of belief priorities. It is improper to say, for instance, that belief at doc j is “carried over” to a lesser
doc i. The property of persistence is valid for belief at degrees of confidence as a consequence of the processing of
prioritized evidence into prioritized beliefs. It does not reflect a property of beliefs per se.
The reasoning that shows why persistence should be considered valid on the basis of the structure of evidence
uptake can be applied to motivate, also, that
(Prudence)Bkϕ ⊃ biϕ where i ≺ k
should be a valid principle. Prudence is a consistency requirement that may be an attractive addition to Æ in applica-
tions. It expresses that what is believed at a lower doc must still be an option at every greater doc. In terms of models,
this implies that the belief state should never be allowed to become empty.
Due to contraposition, Prudence implies that
(4)Bkϕ ⊃ biϕ where i, k are comparable
and hence also a “local” consistency schema,
(5)Biϕ ⊃ biϕ.
This implies bi for any doc i. Ci¬⊥ is always true, so Prudence implies that Ci¬⊥ ∧ bi¬⊥ holds, that less than ⊥
is believed.
The consistency expressed in Prudence could not be captured with just the C operator. We express consistency
of belief, in general, by using b; there is no means of expressing consistency with C or c, with the exception of the
indiscriminate C.
Æ has two complementary axioms governing persistence, PB and PC . While PB expresses that belief is preserved
into lesser doc’s, PC expresses that caution is preserved into greater doc’s. A principle expressed with C and c relating
to Prudence like PC relates to PB would be
(6)Ciϕ ⊃ ckϕ where i, k are comparable.
This implies that some point is always implausible—that the database is never entirely empty.
Persistence ensures that belief states are never weakened as doc is lowered. We could also consider a stronger
property: that a decrease in doc should always be accompanied by a genuine increase in strength of the belief state.
This would ensure validity of the following principle.
(Progress)Oiϕ ⊃ ckϕ where i ≺ k.
There are many interesting representations that fail to satisfy Progress (including the example of Section 6, which
does however satisfy Prudence). Degrees of confidence typically correspond to which sources have been listened to,
which default rules have been applied, which pieces of information have been taken into account, and so forth. A doc i
can be considered a record of the extent of processing that went into forming the belief state at i: the more evidence
is taken into account, the lesser the doc to accompany resultant belief. There is in general nothing exceptional if the
consideration of further evidence fails to strengthen the belief state. Further evidence may be unacceptable because it
is overridden by evidence that carries more weight.
Where k is ≺-minimal, and unique, it is natural to understand Bk as a modality of full conviction. The following
dialog demonstrates that acknowledging non-unique maximal doc’s is counter-intuitive.
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– Yes I do, with a maximal amount of conviction.
– So you don’t believe ¬ϕ, then?
– Oh, I do! In fact, there is nothing I believe with a greater degree of confidence.
We can hardly make sense of this conversation unless we interpret the respondent as expressing an inconsistent dox-
astic attitude toward ϕ. It demonstrates that only maximal and unique elements of I can be adequately interpreted as
representing the common-sense notion of a “maximal degree of confidence”.
In applications, it may be natural to require that only necessities are believed with maximal doc. We may assign a
designated index for the maximal doc, and require that Oϕ ≡ϕ, i.e., O. In the same vein, minimal confidence
could be associated with believing ⊥.
It is worth pointing out that whenever a doxastic subject with degrees of confidence reports a belief that ϕ, the
belief should be reported as being believed with the strongest doc at which ϕ is believed. (For instance, say there is
a degree of conviction i to match what is reported in today’s newspaper. While it is reasonable to say that 2 + 2 = 4
is believed at i, it would be misleading not to report that this is a belief that is accompanied by a maximal doc.) This
may be considered a requirement along the lines of a Gricean maxim to be as informative as possible.
4. Logical spaces and belief state representations for finite languages
The point of a logical space is to mirror the notion of personal metaphysics introduced in Sections 2.2 and 3.1.
Recall that in the Beckham example (Section 3.3), χ can never be appropriately represented as contingent, while
with ψ we have a choice of specifying it as contingent, necessary, or impossible. This can be achieved by means of
different logical spaces. We can also, e.g., define a logical space λ such that λ 
(penguin(Tweety) ⊃ bird(Tweety))
and thereby syntactically express a constraint on conceivability. We may, of course, state this conditional as part of
the agent’s beliefs, but conceptually analytic statements are expressed in a better way at the level of necessity.
In terms of model theory, a logical space corresponds to, and represents, the conceivability space U . U+ and U−
are mirrored by formal expressions which we shall call belief state representations. They can be provided in an explicit
form, from which a model can be directly determined, or in an implicit form which neither needs to have a unique
model nor promises a quick way in which they can be determined. The deep content of the Modal Reduction Theorem
is that any implicit representation can be brought to an equivalent form as a disjunction of explicit representations, a
form which unambiguously exhibits all its models.
4.1. Logical spaces
We will in the rest of this paper assume that the language has finitely many propositional letters; assume they are
p1, . . . , pn (in this fixed order). Let us say that an atom is a conjunction ±p1 ∧ · · · ∧ ±pn where ±pi means either
pi or ¬pi . An atom is the syntactical counterpart to a point, characterizing the material content of a state of affairs,
i.e., the “external world”, neglecting the agent’s cognitive state. Note that any two distinct atoms are inconsistent with
each other and that the disjunction of all atoms is a tautology.
A purely Boolean formula ϕ determines a unique set ϕ̂ of the atoms that imply ϕ. Note that
∨
ϕ̂ is a full DNF
equivalent of ϕ. The following properties are immediate.
Lemma 15. Let ϕ and ψ be purely Boolean and α be an atom.
(1) α 
 ϕ or α 
 ¬ϕ,
(2) ϕ̂ ⊆ ψ̂ iff ϕ 
 ψ .
Let  be a non-empty set of atoms; note that  has at most 2n elements. The logical space spanned by  is defined
as
λ() =
∧ ∧∨
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We shall in the following use the symbol λ to denote an arbitrary logical space.
Lemma 16. Let  be a non-empty set of atoms and M  λ(). Then, for each atom α, α ∈  iff α is true at some point
in M .
Proof. Note that α is true at some point in M iff α is a conjunct of λ(), iff α ∈ . 
Any point in a model satisfies one and only one atom. Since the language is finite we can, for each point x ∈ U ,
define the corresponding atom x in a straightforward way: x is the conjunction of the propositional letters with
each pi negated iff false at x.
Lemma 17. Let ϕ be purely Boolean and M be a model.
(1) ϕ is true at x iff x 
 ϕ,
(2) if M  λ(), then x ∈ ‖ϕ‖ iff x ∈  ∩ ϕ̂.
Proof. (1) Assume that x ϕ. Clearly, x x. We cannot have that x 
 ¬ϕ since this would contradict soundness.
Hence x 
 ϕ follows from Lemma 15(1). The converse direction follows by completeness and the fact that x x.
For (2), note that x 
 ϕ iff x ∈ ϕ̂ (by definition). Also note that since M  λ(), M ∨; hence x ∈  for
each x. Thus, x ∈ ‖ϕ‖ iff x ∈ ϕ̂ and x ∈ . 
Lemma 18. Let ϕ be purely Boolean and λ be a logical space. Then either λ 
ϕ or λ 
 ¬ϕ.
Proof. Let λ be spanned by  and M be any model such that M  λ(). If ‖ϕ‖ = ∅,  ∩ ϕ̂ = ∅ by Lemma 17(2). If
 ∩ ϕ̂ = ∅, Lemmas 16 and 15(1) give that ‖ϕ‖ = ∅. Hence ϕ is satisfied in M iff  ∩ ϕ̂ = ∅, i.e., iff ϕ is satisfied in
every model of λ. Conclude by completeness. 
4.2. Explicit and implicit belief state representations
Let ϕI be a formula of the form
∧
k∈IOkϕk . We will refer to ϕI as an OI -block. If λ is a logical space, λ ∧ ϕI is
called a belief state representation. If each ϕk is purely Boolean, ϕI is a prime OI -block and the corresponding belief
state representation is explicit. Otherwise, λ∧ ϕI is an implicit belief state representation.
If an explicit belief state representation λ∧ψI is satisfiable, it has essentially only one model; moreover, this model
can easily be defined from the formula itself. Otherwise, λ ∧ ψI is inconsistent due to a clash with the persistence
axioms. These observations are made precise in the next lemma, which assumes that ψI is
∧
k∈IOkϕk and λ is
spanned by . Let us, to this end, say that two models are modally equivalent if they agree on the truth value of all
modal atoms.
Lemma 19. Let λ∧ψI be an explicit belief state representation and suppose λ is spanned by . Then
(1) all models of λ∧ψI are modally equivalent,
(2) λ∧ψI is consistent iff  ∩ ϕ̂k ⊆ ϕ̂i for each i 	 k,
(3) either λ∧ψI 
 ϕ or λ∧ψI 
 ¬ϕ for each completely modalized ϕ.
Proof. (1): Let M = (U,U+,U−,V ) and assume that M  λ ∧ ψI . By Lemma 16,  = {x | x ∈ U}. For each doc
k, M partitions  into +k = {x | x ∈ U+k } and −k = {x | x ∈ U−k }. By Lemmas 17(2) and 1(2), +k =  ∩ ϕ̂k and
−k = \+k . Since +k and −k are independent of M , every model of λ∧ψI partitions  in this way. Clearly, all such
models agree on the value of all modal atoms. (2): Assume that ∩ ϕ̂k ⊆ ϕ̂i for each i 	 k. It is then simple to construct
a model for λ ∧ ψI ; the assumption is used to prove that the model satisfies the Persistence property. By soundness,
λ ∧ ψI is consistent. Conversely, if λ ∧ ψI is consistent, it has a model (by completeness). If i 	 k, Lemma 5 gives
that ‖ϕk‖ ⊆ ‖ϕi‖. Conclude by Lemma 17(2). (3): The statement holds trivially if λ ∧ ψI is inconsistent. Otherwise,
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It follows from Lemma 19(3) that the agent’s attitude towards every proposition which can be expressed in the
language can be determined from an explicit belief state representation. A more general explicit representation has
the form
λ∧ (ψI1 ∨ · · · ∨ψIm)
where each ψIi is a prime OI -block. λ ∧ ψI is a special case of this with m = 1; we call explicit representations of
this form unambiguous. Otherwise, the formula (in general) conveys incomplete information about the agent’s beliefs.
Nevertheless the formula expresses that it has at most m models which are not modally equivalent. Note in particular
that for any formula ϕ, we have λ,ψI1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψIm 
 ϕ if and only if λ ∧ ψIi 
 ϕ for each ψIi . Hence, if there are
propositions towards which the agent’s attitude is indeterminate, the explicit representation provides a clear method
for identifying these.
If ψI is not prime, λ ∧ ψI gives an implicit representation of a belief state; implicit because it will in general
require some work to see what its models are. All representations of non-trivial common-sense situations will be
implicit representations, some of which are addressed in Section 6. Whatever form they may have, there is a modal
reduction property which applies to them to the effect that their content can be analyzed and stated in an explicit form
by purely formal manipulations within the logic. This property is manifested in the Modal Reduction Theorem:
Theorem 20. For each logical space λ and OI -block ϕI , for some m  0, there are prime OI -blocks ψI1 , . . . ,ψIm
such that
λ 
 ϕI ≡ (ψI1 ∨ · · · ∨ψIm).
Every such ψIk that is consistent with λ is called a λ-expansion of ϕI . In the case when ϕI has no λ-expansion,
λ 
 ¬ϕI . As each λ-expansion has a unique model, the “if” direction of the theorem states that these models are also
models of ϕI . The “only if” direction states that every other model is not a model of ϕI . Accordingly the theorem
tells us exactly which models the formula has up to modal equivalence.
4.3. A semantic proof of the Modal Reduction Theorem
The idea behind the semantical proof of the Modal Reduction Theorem is to encode part of the semantics into the
syntax. Technically we shall work with the filtration of the canonical model, and the argument rests essentially on
the existence of a sufficiently rich filtration set. More precisely, we define a molecule as a disjunction of atoms; since
there are 2n distinct atoms in our finite language, there are 22n non-equivalent molecules. By convention ⊥ is the
disjunction of the empty set of atoms and is hence a molecule. The filtration set  which underlies the constructions
in this section is the least set of formulae which is closed under subformulae and the following two constraints for
each doc k:
if α is an atom, then bkα, ckα and α are in ,
if μ is a molecule, then Bkμ,Ckμ and μ are in .
By construction  is ≺-closed, and it is hence a filtration set. M†, the filtration of the canonical model wrt. , is
defined as in Section 2.3. In the rest of the section all references to semantical constructions are relative to this model.
We first define a syntactical representation of a set of points in M†. If X is a set of points, X is defined by∨{x | x ∈ X}.
Lemma 21. Let X and Y be subsets of a cluster C (in M†).
(1) X 
 ¬Y  iff X ∩ Y = ∅,
(2) C,¬X 
 Y  iff X ∪ Y = C.
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two different points must disagree on a formula in the filtration set. Since x and y belong to the same cluster, they
agree on every modal atom and must hence disagree on a propositional letter. For (2), note that C 
 X ∨ Y 
whenever X ∪ Y = C and use simple propositional reasoning. 
Let C be a cluster of M† and let C+k and C
−
k be the belief part and co-belief part of C wrt. k. Then
β+k (C) =
∧{
bkx | x ∈ C+k
}∧ BkC+k ,
β−k (C) =
∧{
ckx | x ∈ C−k
}∧ CkC−k ,
λ(C) =
∧{x | x ∈ C}∧C.
We say that β+k (C) is the belief formula of C wrt. k and β−k (C) the co-belief formula of C wrt. k. λ(C) denotes the
logical space spanned by the set of atoms true at a point in C.
Lemma 22. Let C be a cluster and ϕ be purely Boolean. Then M† C Bkϕ iff C+k  
 ϕ and M† C Ckϕ iff C−k  
 ϕ.
Proof. We will only prove the first, since the proof of the latter is symmetrical. Suppose M† C Bkϕ. Then M† x ϕ
for every x ∈ C+k . By Lemma 17(1), C+k  
 ϕ. For the other direction, suppose C+k  
 ϕ. But by definition, M† C
BkC+k . Hence normal modal logic gives M† C Bkϕ. 
Lemma 23. Each cluster C is uniquely characterized by β+k (C)∧ β−k (C).
Proof. Let D be a cluster distinct from C. Then C and D must, by construction of M†, disagree on a formula in 
of the form Bkϕ or Ckϕ. The case where the two clusters disagree on a formula Ckϕ is symmetric to the case where
they disagree on a formula Bkϕ, so we will only treat the Bk-modality.
Assume first that M† C Bkϕ and M† D Bkϕ. By Lemma 22, C+k  
 ϕ and D+k   ϕ. Then D+k   C+k ,
because if D+k  
 C+k , then D+k  
 ϕ. Hence, by Lemma 22, M† D BkC+k . Thus M† D β+k (C)∧ β−k (C).
Conversely, assume that M† C Bkϕ and M† D Bkϕ. Then there is a point x such that x ∈ C+k , x /∈ D+k and
M† x ¬ϕ. By Lemma 17(1), x 
 ¬ϕ. Since β+k (C) 
 bkx, we get β+k (C) 
 bk¬ϕ. Then M† D β+k (C), because
if M† D β+k (C), then M† D bk¬ϕ, contradicting the assumption. Thus M† D β+k (C)∧ β−k (C). 
Lemma 24. Let C be bisected. Then 
 β+k (C)∧ β−k (C) ≡ λ(C)∧OkC+k  for each doc k.
Proof. We have to establish four distinct theorems of Æ.
1. β+k (C),β
−
k (C) 
 λ(C). First, let x ∈ C. Then either x ∈ C+k or x ∈ C−k . In the first case, bkx is a conjunct
of β+k (C); hence β
+
k (C) 
 x. By a similar argument β−k (C) 
 x in the other case. Second, note that since
C+k  
 C, BkC+k  
 BkC. Similarly CkC−k  
 CkC. Hence β+k (C),β−k (C) 
C (by axiom Def).
2. β+k (C),β
−
k (C) 
 OkC+k . First note that BkC+k  is a conjunct of β+k (C). Likewise CkC−k  is a conjunct of
β−k (C). By Lemma 21(1) and modal logic note that CkC−k  
 Ck¬C+k .
3. λ(C),OkC+k  
 β+k (C). First, let x ∈ C+k . Then x is a conjunct of λ(C). By Def, λ(C) 
 bkx ∨ ckx.
Since x 
 C+k , modal logic gives Ck¬C+k  
 ¬ckx. Hence λ(C) 
 bkx. Second, trivially OkC+k  
 BkC+k .
4. λ(C),OkC+k  
 β−k (C). Let x ∈ C−k . Since x 
 C−k , Bk¬C−k  
 ¬bkx. By Lemma 21(1) and modal
logic BkC+k  
 Bk¬C−k . Hence OkC+k  
 ¬bkC−k . As in the previous case λ(C) 
 bkx∨ ckx; hence λ(C) 

ckx. Second, note that Lemma 21(2) and modal logic give CkC,Ck¬C+k  
 CkC−k . Clearly, λ(C) 
 CkC and
OkC
+
k  
 Ck¬C+k . Thus λ(C),OkC+k  
 CkC−k . 
We now complete the semantic proof of the Modal Reduction Theorem: For each logical space λ and OI -block
ϕI , for some m 0, there are prime OI -blocks ψI1 , . . . ,ψIm such that
λ 
 ϕI ≡ (ψI ∨ · · · ∨ψIm).1
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that θ ∈ s, s ∈ Wc. As θ is a Boolean combination of formulae in , and M† is the filtration of Mc through , we
may apply the Filtration Theorem 13 to infer that M† |s| θ . Let C be the cluster containing |s|. Since 
 θ ≡ ϕI , the
Soundness Theorem entails that M† |s| ϕI . By Lemmas 2 and 9, C is bisected. Lemma 24 is then applicable, and we
may infer that M† |s| ψI (C), where ψI (C) =∧k∈I OkC+k . By the Filtration Theorem, ψI (C) ∈ s. This proves
that 
 ϕI ⊃ ψI (C1)∨ · · · ∨ψI (Cm), where C1, . . . ,Cm are all the clusters satisfying ϕI .
For the other direction, let C be a cluster in M† such that M† C θ , and let ψI (C) =∧k∈I OkC+k  ∈ s. Let D be
the cluster containing |s|. By the Filtration Theorem, M† |s| ψI (C), and then also M† D ψI (C). By Lemma 2, D
is bisected, and Lemma 24 can be used to infer that M† D β+k (C)∧ β−k (C). By Lemma 23, C = D, i.e., |s| ∈ C. By
assumption, M† C θ , and so M† |s| θ . By the Filtration Theorem, θ ∈ s. We have then proved that ψI (C) 
 θ . As θ
is equivalent to ϕI , we have ψI (C) 
 ϕI for every cluster C satisfying ϕI , i.e., ψI (C1)∨ · · · ∨ψI (Cm) 
 ϕI , where
C1, . . . ,Cm are the clusters satisfying ϕI . 
5. Computational aspects
The size of the logical space is clearly exponential in the number of propositional variables. Explicitly specifying
the logical space can, however, be avoided by using a purely Boolean formula as a basis for an implicit generation
of the logical space. This is addressed in Section 5.1. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3 we once again address the Modal
Reduction Theorem, but this time from a syntactical and constructive point of view. More precisely we show how an
explicit representation can be obtained from an implicit one by a series of equivalence-preserving rewriting operations.
In Section 5.4 we address the computational complexity of this procedure.
5.1. The system Æρ
Let ρ be any consistent purely Boolean formula. The system Æρ contains the axioms and inference rules from the
definition of Æ, as well as the following for purely Boolean ϕ.
RI: ρ ρ,ϕ PL ⊥ϕ (RC).
We shall use 
ρ to denote the deducibility relation of Æρ . The formula ρ is called the characteristic formula of
the system Æρ . In the following λ(ρ) is shorthand for λ(ρ̂ ). RI and RC were added to ensure the following result.
Lemma 25. 
ρ λ(ρ) for any consistent purely Boolean ρ.
Proof. 
ρ ∨ ρ̂ follows by RI, the observation 
∨ ρ̂ ≡ ρ, Lemma 1(4), completeness of Æ, inclusion of Æ in Æρ
and the fact that the latter is closed under MP. 
ρ α, for any α ∈ ρ̂, follows in a similar manner by RC. 
Example 26. Let ρ be p ≡ q . Since 
 ρ ≡ (¬p ∧ ¬q)∨ (p ∧ q) we can derive the following.
ρ,¬p ∧ ¬q PL ⊥

ρ (¬p ∧ ¬q)
ρ,p ∧ q PL ⊥

ρ (p ∧ q) 
ρ 
(
(¬p ∧ ¬q)∨ (p ∧ q)).
It is easy to see that λ(ρ) is (¬p ∧ ¬q)∧(p ∧ q)∧((¬p ∧ ¬q)∨ (p ∧ q)).
Theorem 27. Let ρ be a consistent purely Boolean formula and ϕ any formula. Then λ(ρ) 
 ϕ iff 
ρ ϕ.
Proof. Only if: Assume λ 
 ϕ, i.e., 
 λ ⊃ ϕ and hence 
ρ λ ⊃ ϕ. Now 
ρ ϕ follows from the lemma above and the
fact that MP is a rule of Æρ . If: We show by induction on the proofs of Æρ that 
ρ ϕ implies λ 
 ϕ. Now any axiom
of Æρ except RI is an axiom of Æ, hence for the basis it suffices to establish λ 
ρ, which follows directly from the
observation 
∨ ρ̂ ≡ ρ. There are three induction steps, corresponding to the rules of Æρ . RC: If ρ,ψ PL ⊥, i.e.,
ρ PL ¬ψ , there must (by trivial reasoning on truth tables) also be an atom α ∈ ρ̂ such that α 
PL ψ . Thus α 
ψ
and, consequently, λ 
 ψ . MP: If 
ρ ψ was derived from 
ρ ϕ ⊃ ψ and 
ρ ϕ, then λ 
 ϕ ⊃ ψ and λ 
 ϕ by the
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 ψ . RN: If 
ρ ϕ was derived from 
ρ ϕ, then λ 
 ϕ by the induction hypothesis,
hence λ 
ϕ. As λ is completely modalized, λ 
ϕ follows. 
The validity of certain implications can be carried out completely within propositional logic by using the charac-
teristic formula ρ instead of λ.
Lemma 28. For any purely Boolean ϕ, ψ and ρ:
(1)λ(ρ)∧Okϕ 
 Bkψ iff ρ,ϕ 
 ψ,
(2)λ(ρ)∧Okϕ 
 Ckψ iff ρ,¬ψ 
 ϕ,
(3)λ(ρ)∧Okϕ 
 Okψ iff ρ 
 ϕ ≡ ψ,
(4)λ(ρ) 
ψ iff ρ 
 ψ.
Proof. We prove the first and leave the others to the reader. The “if” direction follows by standard modal logic.
Conversely, assume that λ(ρ) ∧ Okϕ 
 Bkψ . If ρ is inconsistent, ρ,ϕ 
 ψ follows trivially. Otherwise, λ(ρ) ∧ Okϕ
has a model M in which ‖ϕ‖ ⊆ ‖ψ‖. By Lemma 17(2), ϕ̂ ∩ ρ̂ ⊆ ψ̂ . By Lemma 15(2), ρ,ϕ 
 ψ . 
Lemma 29. Let i 	 k. For any purely Boolean ϕ, ψ and ρ:
λ(ρ)∧Oiϕ 
 ¬Okψ if ρ,ψ  ϕ.
Proof. Assume that λ(ρ)∧Oiϕ ∧Okψ is consistent. By Lemma 19(2), ρ̂ ∩ ψ̂ ⊆ ϕ̂. By Lemma 15(2) ρ,ψ 
 ϕ. 
5.2. Rewriting rules
Generating the λ-expansions of an OI -block can be done by rewriting it using provable equivalences within the
logic. The formula is first expanded, then collapsed.
To apply the expand rule one must select a modal atom β of modal depth 1 and substitute it with  and ⊥ in the
following way:
(E)Oiϕ →β
(
Oiϕ[β/] ∧ β
)∨ (Oiϕ[β/⊥] ∧ ¬β).
The soundness of this rule follows immediately from Lemma 3. After using the expand rule, one may apply the
collapse rules. In the rules below, all occurrences of ϕ and ψ are propositional and i 	 k. The collapse rules pertaining
to B-formulae are:
(B1)Oiϕ ∧ Bkψ →ρ Oiϕ if ρ 
 (ϕ ⊃ ψ),
(B2)Oiϕ ∧ ¬Bkψ →ρ ⊥ if ρ 
 (ϕ ⊃ ψ),
(B3)Okϕ ∧ Biψ →ρ ⊥ if ρ  (ϕ ⊃ ψ),
(B4)Okϕ ∧ ¬Biψ →ρ Okϕ if ρ  (ϕ ⊃ ψ)
to C-formulae:
(C1)Okϕ ∧ Ciψ →ρ Okϕ if ρ 
 (¬ψ ⊃ ϕ),
(C2)Okϕ ∧ ¬Ciψ →ρ ⊥ if ρ 
 (¬ψ ⊃ ϕ),
(C3)Oiϕ ∧ Ckψ →ρ ⊥ if ρ  (¬ψ ⊃ ϕ),
(C4)Oiϕ ∧ ¬Ckψ →ρ Oiϕ if ρ  (¬ψ ⊃ ϕ)
and to -formulae:
(1)Oiϕ ∧ψ →ρ Oiϕ if ρ 
 ψ,
(2)Oiϕ ∧ ¬ψ →ρ ⊥ if ρ 
 ψ,
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(4)Oiϕ ∧ ¬ψ →ρ Oiϕ if ρ ψ.
As shown below, the rules are sound. They are not complete, as distribution and simplification rules are required.
This, however, is outside the scope of the present article.
Lemma 30. The collapse rules are sound.
Proof. Let λ = λ(ρ). For B1 and B2 we need to show that
λ∧Oiϕ 
 Bkψ if ρ 
 (ϕ ⊃ ψ),
which by Lemma 28(1) is equivalent to “λ∧Oiϕ 
 Bkψ if λ∧Oiϕ 
 Biψ”, which follows from persistence. For B3
and B4 we need to show that
λ∧Okϕ 
 ¬Biψ if ρ  (ϕ ⊃ ψ),
which follows by Lemmas 19(3) and 28(1) and persistence (ρ  ϕ ⊃ ψ yields λ ∧ Okϕ  Bkψ by Lemma 28(1),
and as k is the only doc involved, Lemma 19(3) now yields λ ∧ Okϕ 
 ¬Bkψ , which implies λ ∧ Okϕ 
 ¬Biψ by
persistence). Soundness of the C-rules is proved similarly. For 1 and 2 we need to show that
λ∧Oiϕ 
ψ if ρ 
 ψ,
which follows from Lemma 28(4). For 3 and 4 we need to show that
λ∧Oiϕ 
 ¬ψ if ρ ψ,
which follows by Lemmas 19 and 28 (ρ ψ is equivalent to λ ψ by Lemma 28(4), and now by a trivial, degenerate
special case of Lemma 19(3) this yields λ 
 ¬ψ , and hence also λ∧Oiϕ 
 ¬ψ ). 
5.3. A syntactic proof of the Modal Reduction Theorem
Let β be a modal atom of depth 1, and let v be either ⊥ or . Then β/v is said to be a Boolean binding. A set
of Boolean bindings is a modal valuation if it contains no subset of the form {β/⊥, β/}, i.e., if it never “binds” the
same modal atom to conflicting values.
When ϕ is any formula and σ is the sequence 〈β1/v1, . . . , βm/vm〉 of Boolean bindings, we will write ϕ[σ ] for
((ϕ[β1/v1]) . . .)[βm/vm]. Note that a modal valuation only contains bindings for modal atoms of depth 1; thus the
set {Bk/,BkBk/⊥} is not a modal valuation even though it does not (directly) assign conflicting values to the
same modal atom. It is disallowed for good reasons, as the two sequences 〈Bk/,Bk/〉 and 〈BkBk/⊥〉—which
both contain only bindings from this set—yield conflicting values when applied to the formula BkBk. Proper modal
valuations are better behaved, as seen from the next lemma. Since their bindings only apply to modal atoms of depth
1, a sequence of such bindings only removes one modal operator at a time, going outwards in the formula. Hence
whenever ϕ[σ ] is purely Boolean, then so is ψ[σ ] for any subformula ψ of ϕ. This observation is crucial in the proof
of the next lemma.
Lemma 31. Let V be a modal valuation and let σ and τ be two sequences of bindings from V . Then ϕ[σ ] = ϕ[τ ] if
ϕ[σ ] and ϕ[τ ] are both purely Boolean.
Proof. Suppose ϕ[σ ] and ϕ[τ ] are both purely Boolean, and that σ and τ only contain bindings from V . We show,
by induction on ψ , the more general result that ψ[σ ] = ψ[τ ] for any subformula ψ of ϕ.
This is trivial for purely Boolean ψ , hence the result holds in the basis. The induction steps for Boolean connectives
are also immediate. The induction steps for modal operators are all similar; we consider Bk .
Hence suppose (for the induction hypothesis) that ψ[σ ] = ψ[τ ], and that Bkψ is a subformula of ϕ. By the above
observation, ψ[σ ] and ψ[τ ] are purely Boolean as well. Now let σ0 and τ0 be the shortest initial segments of σ and τ ,
respectively, such that ψ[σ0] = ψ[σ ] = ψ[τ ] = ψ[τ0]. Then (Bkψ)[σ0] = Bk(ψ[σ0]) and (Bkψ)[τ0] = Bk(ψ[τ0]).
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bindings occur in V and V is a modal valuation, the two bindings are identical. Thus (Bkψ)[σ ] = (Bkψ)[τ ]. 
A modal valuation V is said to be a modal valuation of ϕ if ϕ[σ ] is purely Boolean for some sequence σ of bindings
from V . The above lemma says that this value is independent of the particular σ , provided σ contains sufficiently many
bindings to make the result purely Boolean. Hence we shall be permitted to write ϕ[V ] for this unique purely Boolean
formula when V is a modal valuation of ϕ.
Note that two distinct modal valuations may produce the same formula, i.e., both {Bkp/,Bk/} and
{Bkp/⊥,Bk⊥/} evaluate BkBkp to . Let V be a modal valuation; the following function is useful.
φ(V ) =
∧
β/v∈V
(β ≡ v).
Thus φ(V ) is equivalent to a conjunction of the modal atoms in the bindings in V , negated if bound to ⊥. A modal
valuation of ϕ is minimal if no proper subset is a modal valuation of ϕ; we write M(ϕ) for the set of minimal modal
valuations of ϕ. By mod(ϕ) we denote the set of modal atoms (of any depth) occurring in ϕ.
Lemma 32. If |mod(ϕ)| = m, then |M(ϕ)| 2m. Moreover, ∨V∈M(ϕ) φ(V ) is a tautology.
Proof. By induction on the number of modal atoms in ϕ. The basis is obvious, as M(ϕ) = {∅} for any purely Boolean
ϕ, and φ(∅) = . The induction step follows from the observation that if β is a modal atom of depth 1 occurring in
ϕ, then something is a minimal modal valuation of ϕ iff for v =  or v = ⊥ it is of the form {β/v} ∪ V , where V is a
minimal modal valuation of ϕ[β/v] not containing the binding β/v˜, where v˜ is the opposite Boolean value of v. 
Lemma 33. For any formula ϕ we have the following:

 Oiϕ ≡
∨
V∈M(ϕ)
(
Oi
(
ϕ[V ])∧ φ(V )).
Proof. By the preceding lemma we have 
 Oiϕ ≡ ∨V∈M(ϕ)(Oiϕ ∧ φ(V )), and by repeated applications of
Lemma 1(4), each disjunct Oiϕ ∧ φ(V ) is equivalent to Oi(ϕ[V ])∧ φ(V ). 
Let ϕI =∧k∈I Okϕk be an OI -block and let V be a modal valuation of ∧k∈I ϕk . Then ∧k∈I Ok(ϕk[V ]) is said to
be the expansion candidate of ϕI wrt. V . Since V is a modal valuation of each ϕk , the expansion candidates are all
prime OI -blocks. Hence the next lemma takes us almost to the Modal Reduction Theorem:
Lemma 34. Let ϕI =∧k∈I Okϕk be an OI -block and m = |mod(∧k∈I ϕk)|. Let V1, . . . , V2m be the minimal modal
valuations of ∧k∈I ϕk and ψI1 , . . . ,ψI2m be the expansion candidates of ϕI wrt. V1, . . . , V2m , respectively. Then

 ϕI ≡
2m∨
i=1
(
ψIi ∧ φ(Vi)
)
.
Proof. This is a straightforward generalization of Lemma 33: by Lemma 32 we have 
 ϕI ≡∨2mi=1(ϕI ∧ φ(Vi)), and
by repeated applications of Lemma 1(4), each disjunct ϕI ∧ φ(Vi) is equivalent to ψIi ∧ φ(Vi). 
From the proofs of Lemmas 32–34 it can be seen that the DNF formulae at the right-hand sides in Lemmas 33
and 34 are derivable from the respective left-hand sides by repeated applications of the expand rewriting rule in
Lemma 3, together with rules that distribute disjunction over conjunction, and remove any conjunctions containing
pairs of opposite literals.
Lemma 35. Let λ be a logical space, ψI a prime OI -block and φ any conjunction of modal literals of depth 1. Then
λ 
 (ψI ∧ φ) ≡ ψI or λ 
 (ψI ∧ φ) ≡ ⊥.
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the collapse rules, in conjunction with such propositional rules as associativity and commutativity of conjunction. 
The Modal Reduction Theorem follows directly from the two preceding lemmas.
5.4. Complexity
If a problem is at least as hard as the hardest problem in a complexity class C, it is C-hard. A problem in C that
is also C-hard, is C-complete. The polynomial hierarchy of complexity classes is defined as follows: p0 = p0 =

p
0 = P, and for all i  0, pi+1 = P
p
i , 
p
i+1 = NP
p
i and pi+1 = coNP
p
i
. On the first level of the polynomial
hierarchy we find the familiar classes p1 = P, p1 = NP and p1 = coNP. Propositional satisfiability and validity are
NP- and coNP-complete respectively. On level 2 we find the versions of the level 1 classes that have access to an
NP oracle (they can solve any problem in NP in constant time), most notably p2 = PNP, p2 = NPNP = NPcoNP, and

p
2 = coNPNP. A property of the polynomial hierarchy is that determining whether an instance of a problem is in pi ,
is in pi−1. Thus determining whether an instance of a problem is in 
p
2 , is in coNP.
In order to prove p2 -membership we need an algorithm which nondeterministically generates a possible expan-
sion, and then with a linear (in the size of the input formula) number of coNP-complete calls, determines whether it
really is an expansion.
Algorithm 1. Does the OI -block ϕI have a λ(ρ)-expansion in the logic Æρ? Nondeterministically generate an ex-
pansion candidate ψI of ϕI wrt. some modal valuation V . Then determine whether (1) ψI is Æρ-consistent, and if it
is, determine whether (2) ψI ∧ φ(V ) is Æρ-consistent. If (2) is true, ψI is a λ(ρ)-expansion, otherwise it is not.
Theorem 36. The problem of determining whether the OI -block ϕI has a λ(ρ)-expansion in the logic Æρ is p2 -
complete.
Proof. Membership: Assume that ϕI is of the form O1ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧Onϕn. By Lemma 29, condition (1) of Algorithm 1
can be checked with n − 1 propositional validity tests: for each 1  i < n, determine whether λ(ρ) ∧ Oi(ϕi[V ]) 

¬Oi+1(ϕi+1[V ]). By Lemmas 29 and 34, condition (2) can be checked with |mod(ϕ1)∪ · · · ∪ mod(ϕn)| propositional
validity tests: for each modal literal β that is a conjunct in φ(V ), determine whether λ(ρ) ∧ Oi(ϕi[V ]) 
 β if β is of
the form Biχ or Ciχ , and whether λ(ρ) 
 β if β is of the form χ .
Hardness: Since Æ is equivalent to the propositional fragment of Levesque’s system, determining whether a
formula of the form Okϕ is satisfiable in Æ is equivalent to determining whether {ϕ} has a stable expansion in
autoepistemic logic [8], a problem which is p2 -hard [5]. 
6. Example: Supernormal defaults
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how the procedure introduced in Section 5 can be applied to the
formalization of default theories. We restrict ourselves to the class of supernormal defaults, i.e., statements of the
form “if ϕ is consistent, add it to the belief set”. Defaults of this form have been studied in traditional Reiter-style
default logics, and it is well known that they are particularly well behaved. In particular, a supernormal default theory
is guaranteed to have extensions.
In Section 6.1 we use Æ with a single confidence level to formalize an example due to Reiter [12]. This illustrates
features of Æ and motivates Section 6.2. In that section we enrich the default representation with priorities, the function
of which is to constrain the order in which the defaults are tested. Priorities are implemented by means of confidence
levels and the underlying persistence property. The proof of the adequacy of the representation employs the procedure
provided in Section 5.
In the literature formalizations of prioritized default theories have been proposed in which the order relation has
been given either a descriptive interpretation [1] or a prescriptive interpretation [2]. For supernormal defaults, the two
proposals coincide with the formalization addressed in Section 6.2. An encoding of prescriptively ordered default
theories into Æ is given in [3] along with further discussion of the subject.
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Assume a finite set D of default names and a function ϕ which assigns a purely Boolean formula to each element
in D. As usual we write ϕa for ϕ(a).
We shall first represent the default theory which consists of supernormal defaults with consequent ϕ(a), for all
a ∈ D. To this end we let the index set I consist of a single doc and let ≺ be empty. The property corresponding
to the statement “the proposition ϕ holds by default” is formalized by the formula bϕ ⊃ ϕ within the scope of the
O-modality. We will refer to this formula as a default conditional when it occurs within the modal O-context. The
purpose of the following function is to individuate default conditionals:
δ(a) = bϕa ⊃ ϕa.
Note that δ(a) is equivalent to ¬ϕa ⊃ B¬ϕa , i.e., should ϕ be false, the subject will believe that it is.
We shall illustrate this default representation by means of an example inspired by Reiter [12, Example 2.1].
Example 37. Let D = {a, b, c}, ϕa = p, ϕb = q , and ϕc = r . Let ψ = κ ∧δ(a)∧δ(b)∧δ(c). A novel point in Æ is that
we can select different, and illuminating, characteristic formulae to span the logical space, and thereby characterize
the joint impact that the logical space and the “knowledge base” κ have on the evaluation of defaults. Below we define
four distinct logical spaces and draw some consequences of relevance for the default representation. In each case, κ is
satisfiable and without occurrences of p, q , r .
ρ1 = κ λ(ρ1) 
(κ ∧ p ∧ q ∧ r)
ρ2 = κ ⊃ (¬p ∨ ¬q) λ(ρ2) 
 ¬(κ ∧ p ∧ q)∧(κ ∧ p ∧ r)∧(κ ∧ q ∧ r)
ρ3 = κ ⊃ (¬p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r) λ(ρ3) 
 ¬(κ ∧ p ∧ q ∧ r)
ρ4 = κ ⊃
(
q ⊃ (¬p ∧ ¬r)) λ(ρ4) 
 ¬(κ ∧ q ∧ p)∧ ¬(κ ∧ q ∧ r).
Noticing the pattern for ρ1 and ρ2 the reader will easily figure out entailed possibilities in the latter two cases as
well (and not mere impossibilities). A crucial point in the Æ approach to default representation is that the  operator
serves the function of an operator for logical possibility. It can serve this function precisely because the logical space
formalizes the notion of logical necessity. The b operator similarly formalizes the notion of being consistent with what
is believed, which lies at the heart of the formal rendition of defaults by means of default conditionals.
Another central point in Æ is that the evaluation of defaults is carried out within the logic itself in the form of
provable equivalents. In this example the reduction to explicit belief representations are reflected in the following
theorems of Æ.
λ(ρ1) 
 Oψ ≡ O(κ ∧ p ∧ q ∧ r),
λ(ρ2) 
 Oψ ≡ O(κ ∧ p ∧ r)∨O(κ ∧ q ∧ r),
λ(ρ3) 
 Oψ ≡ O(κ ∧ p ∧ q)∨O(κ ∧ p ∧ r)∨O(κ ∧ q ∧ r),
λ(ρ4) 
 Oψ ≡ O(κ ∧ q)∨O(κ ∧ p ∧ r).
Recalling the definition of λ-expansion from Section 4.2 we see that there are exactly two distinct expansions for
λ(ρ4). For the maximal logical space this notion corresponds exactly to the notion of a stable expansion in autoepis-
temic logic, cf. [8]. The fact that the O operator permits us to characterize the belief state precisely is essential for the
provability of the equivalences.
Conceptually there is an important difference in the way that defaults are treated in Æ (and in autoepistemic
approaches in general) and in Reiter-style default logics. To use a conditional for the representation of a default
means to state an invariant of a belief set. It is equivalences like those above which demonstrate that adoption of
such conditionals gives the belief set a behavior which matches intuitions behind default rules. The Æ representation
provides a denotational representation of defaults while Reiter provides an operational account.
The belief set in the example above is characterized by a simultaneous belief in different default conditionals. In
consequence there is no way of resolving conflicts. This is the subject of the next section.
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Let < be a strict partial order on D. The intuition is that if a < b, then default a has to be applied before default b.
To capture this let an application sequence be a finite string over D without repetition of symbols. The concatenation
of s and t is denoted st . The empty sequence is denoted ε. It has length 0 and is the identity element wrt. concatenation.
The prefix order 	 is defined as s 	 st , where s and t are any application sequences (including ε). The precedence
set over P = (D,<) is defined as the least set TP such that
(1) ε ∈ TP , and
(2) tb ∈ TP if t ∈ TP , b does not occur in t , and every a such that a < b occurs in t .
The following observation is easy to prove.
Lemma 38. Let P = (D,<). Then (TP ,≺) is a tree rooted in ε whose nodes are application sequences over D. Each
leaf corresponds to a topological sorting of P and every topological sorting corresponds to a leaf in the tree.
We want to show that these simple concepts provide us with a constructive way of analyzing the generation process
of extensions. The following example depicts the graphical structure we obtain from the topologically sorted strings.
Example 39. Let D be as in Example 37, and assume that the extension of the < order is b < a and b < c. Let P be
(D,<). The corresponding precedence tree is depicted as solid lines in Fig. 5. Dotted lines indicate branches in the
tree with an empty order relation; application sequences along dotted lines clash with the <-relation of this example.
Fig. 5. Solid lines mark (T(D,<),≺). For an empty priority relation, include the dotted lines.
Let us now address the assignment of propositional content to the nodes in the tree. A subtle technical detail to this
end is that we shall have to alter the definition of a default conditional and say that a default conditional is a formula
biϕ ⊃ ϕ which occurs within the scope of an Ok-modality such that i 	 k. The key lemma follows.
Lemma 40. Let λ be a logical space, and let κ and
∧
k∈I ϕk be purely Boolean. Then the OI -block
∧
k∈I Ok(κ ∧∧
i	k(biϕi ⊃ ϕi)) has a unique λ-expansion.
Proof. Say that J ⊆ I is closed if i ∈ J whenever i 	 k and k ∈ J . Now writing ζk for (κ ∧∧i	k(biϕi ⊃ ϕi)), we
show that for each closed J ⊆ I there will be some modal valuation V of ∧k∈J Bk¬ϕk such that
λ 

∧
k∈J
Okζk ≡
∧
k∈J
Ok
(
ζk[V ]
)∧ φ(V ) ≡∧
k∈J
Ok
(
ζk[V ]
)
.
The lemma follows from this, as the special case J = I yields the prime OI -block ∧k∈I Ok(ζk[V ]) which by
Lemma 19(2) is consistent with λ as each ζk[V ] is equivalent to the conjunction κ ∧∧{ϕi | i 	 k, Bi¬ϕi/⊥ ∈ V },
i.e., with non-increasing sets of conjuncts for “greater” doc’s k.
The proof is by induction on J . It is trivial for empty J , as
∧
k∈∅ ζk ≡ φ(∅) ≡ . For the induction step, suppose
J is non-empty; then J = J0 ∪ {j} for some j, J0 such that j 	 k for no k ∈ J0. J0 is closed since J is, hence by the
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∧
k∈J0 Bk¬ϕk such that
λ 

∧
k∈J0
Okζk ≡
∧
k∈J0
Ok
(
ζk[V0]
)∧ φ(V0) ≡ ∧
k∈J0
Ok
(
ζk[V0]
)
.
Now Oj(ζj [V0]) is of the form Oj(ψ ∧ (bjϕj ⊃ ϕj )) for a purely Boolean ψ . By Lemma 3 this is equivalent to the
disjunction of
Oj
(
ψ ∧ (bjϕj ⊃ ϕj )
)[Bj¬ϕj/] ∧Bj¬ϕj , i.e., Ojψ ∧Bj¬ϕj , and
Oj
(
ψ ∧ (bjϕj ⊃ ϕj )
)[Bj¬ϕj/⊥] ∧ ¬Bj¬ϕj , i.e., Oj(ψ ∧ ϕj )∧ ¬Bj¬ϕj .
Now (if we let ρ be such that λ = λ(ρ)) ρ 
 ψ ⊃ ¬ϕj iff ρ 
 (ψ ∧ ϕj ) ⊃ ¬ϕj , hence by soundness of the collapse
rules exactly one of the two disjuncts reduces to its first conjunct, while the other reduces to ⊥. Hence either for v = 
or v = ⊥ we have
λ 
 Oj
(
ζj [V0]
)≡ Oj (ζj [V0][Bj¬ϕj/v])∧ (Bj¬ϕj ≡ v) ≡ Oj (ζj [V0][Bj¬ϕj/v]).
Putting this together, we see that the following are all equivalent given λ.∧
k∈J0
Okζk ∧Ojζj ,
∧
k∈J0
Ok
(
ζk[V0]
)∧ φ(V0)∧Ojζj ,
∧
k∈J0
Ok
(
ζk[V0]
)∧ φ(V0)∧Oj (ζj [V0]),
∧
k∈J0
Ok
(
ζk[V0]
)∧ φ(V0)∧Oj (ζj [V0][Bj¬ϕj/v])∧ (Bj¬ϕj ≡ v),
∧
k∈J0
Ok
(
ζk[V0]
)∧Oj (ζj [V0][Bj¬ϕj/v]).
Setting V = V0 ∪ {Bj¬ϕj/v}, we obtain ζk[V0] = ζk[V ] for any k ∈ J0, while ζj [V0][Bj¬ϕj/v] = ζj [V ]. Thus the
first and two last of the above can be identified as the three formulae that were to be shown equivalent given λ. 
Let us now address the encoding of the prioritized default theory in Æ. The idea is to use TP as the index set I in
the signature of Æ and use the prefix ordering 	 to distinguish degrees of confidence. When we interpret modalities
as application sequences we employ them as devices for protecting information. We extend the δ function in an
interesting way:
δ(sa) = bsaϕa ⊃ ϕa.
Note that it is the last term in the application sequence which selects the particular ϕ, while the modal context of the
consistency check is given by the whole term.
On the basis of Lemma 40 we propose the following representation of the prioritized default theory P = (D,<)
with assignment function ϕ.
P,κε = Oεκ,
P,κsa = Osa
(
κ ∧
∧
tb	sa
δ(tb)
)
,
P,κ =
∧
t∈TP
P,κt .
Theorem 41. P,κ has a unique λ-expansion.
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TP , and put ϕ = . 
The maximal nodes in the unique λ-expansion of (D,<), κ play a central role as they correspond to the “final”
beliefs up to <. We close the article by addressing our example once again.
Example 42. Continuing Example 39 we note that P,κ is
Oεκ ∧ Ob
(
κ ∧ δ(b))
∧ Oba
(
κ ∧ δ(b)∧ δ(ba))∧Obac(κ ∧ δ(b)∧ δ(ba)∧ δ(bac))
∧ Obc
(
κ ∧ δ(b)∧ δ(bc))∧Obca(κ ∧ δ(b)∧ δ(bc)∧ δ(bca)),
which has the unique λ(ρ4)-expansion
Oεκ ∧Ob(κ ∧ q)∧Oba(κ ∧ q)∧Obac(κ ∧ q)∧Obc(κ ∧ q)∧Obca(κ ∧ q).
7. History and related work
The present work extends the conference paper [10]. It was initiated by the first author’s doctoral thesis [17], in
which the Modal Reduction Theorem for the system Æ was first established. The theorem for Levesque’s system has
later been discovered independently by Levesque and Lakemeyer and appears as Corollary 9.5.6 in [9]; their proof
is similar in style to the proof in Section 5 but with a less general transformation strategy. The construction in the
semantical proof of the Modal Reduction Theorem is inspired by a note of Segerberg [15] written in response to [17].
The present work has been extended to a multi-modal language. In [19] the model theory of Æ is generalized
to the multi-modal case, while a proof theory for the multi-modal extension of Æ is given in [18]. This includes
cut-elimination results for a sequent calculus formulation of the logic. A sequent calculus for the logic addressed in
this article is trivially obtained by restricting the language in [18] to a single agent.
In the language of Æ formulated in this paper, it is not possible to express properties about indices in I or about
the preference relation ≺ within the language. It would be interesting to see whether the techniques of term-modal
logics [4] can be applied also to Æ, possibly with a cautious introduction of quantifiers. If the language is extended to
decidable fragments of first-order logic, it can presumably still be used to represent defaults along the lines sketched
in this paper. The point is that the term universe must be finite. We must also restrict the language to formulae in 10 ,
like ∃x bird(x), and formulae in 10 like ∀x(penguin(x) ⊃ bird(x)). Such formulae do not generate new terms
and hence reduce to purely Boolean logic. In this way the system can be extended to restricted fragments of first-
order logic which nevertheless are sufficient for describing a number of common-sense situations. Of course, if we
extend the language to full first-order logic, the system can no longer be used to represent default reasoning along the
lines sketched in this paper. In general it will then impossible be to represent the space of conceivability with a finite
formula. In fact such systems suffer from a fundamental incompleteness property [6].
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